Contrasting with the allocatively, productively and dynamically efficient market model are monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels. When only one or a few firms exist in the market, and there is no credible threat of the entry of competing firms, prices rise above the competitive level, to either a monopolistic or oligopolistic equilibrium price.
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Neo-Classical Synthesis (cont.)
This traces to Austrian-American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter's notion that a "perennial gale of creative destruction" is ever sweeping through capitalist economies, driving enterprise at the market's mercy. This led Schumpeter to argue that monopolies did not need to be broken up (as with Standard Oil) because the next gale of economic innovation would do the same.
Monday, September 27, 2010
Neoclassical Synthesis (cont.)
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Friday, September 24, 2010
Neo-Classical Synthesis (cont..)
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Neo-Classical Synthesis (cont.)
Because rational producers will keep producing and selling, and buyers will keep buying up to the last marginal unit of output - or alternatively rational producers will be reduce their output at the margin at which buyers will buy the same amount as produced - there is no waste, the greatest number wants of the greatest number of people become satisfied and utility is perfected because resources can no longer by reallocated to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off; society has achieved allocative efficiency.
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
Neo-classical synthesis (cont.)
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Neo-Classical Synthesis
Monday, September 20, 2010
Neo-classical synthesis
After Mill, there was a shift in economic theory, which emphasised a more precise and theorectical moldel of competition. A simple neo-classical model of free markets holds that production and distribution of goods and services in competitive free markets maximizes social welfare. This model assumes that new firms can freely enter markets and compete with existing firms, or to use legal language, there are no barriers to entry.
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Saturday, September 18, 2010
Theory
"Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society...both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purpose of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil..."
Friday, September 17, 2010
Theory
Smith also rejected the very existence of, not just dominant and abusive corporations, but corporations at all. By the latter half of the nineteenth century it had become clear that large firms had become a fact of the market economy. John Stuart Mill's approach was laid down in his treatise On Liberty (1859).
Thursday, September 16, 2010
Theory
"People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary."
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Theory
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Theory
"A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly understocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate...
Monday, September 13, 2010
Theory
Restraints were judged as permissible or not by courts as new cases appeared and in the light of changing business circumstances. Hence the courts found specific categories of agreement, specific clauses, to fall foul of their doctrine on economic fairness, and they did not contrive an overarching conception of market power. Earlier theorists like Adam Smith rejected any monopoly power on this basis.
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Theory
Saturday, September 11, 2010
Theory
Under the doctrine of laissez-faire, antitrust is seen as unnecessary as competition is viewed as a longterm dynamic process where firms compete against each other for market dominance. In some markets a firm may successfully dominate, but it is because of superior skill or innovativeness. However, according to laissez-faire theorists, when it tries to raise prices to take advantage of its monopoly position it creates profitable opportunities for others to compete. A process of creative destruction begins which erodes the monopoly. Therefore, government should not try to break up monopoly but should allow the market to work.
Friday, September 10, 2010
International Enforcement
It is unclear whether competition policy is a sensible role for government in developing, particularly low-income countries. In these countries the markets are usually very small and fragmented so that developing scale sufficient to raise competitiveness and engage in international markets is a major challenge. The bigger problem is however poor governance - in societies with widespread corruption, inadequate public finances, and weak judiciary and oversight institutions, competition policy may become another tool for capture by vested interests - becoming in itself a barrier to entry.
Thursday, September 9, 2010
International Enforcement
Despite that, at the ongoing Doha round of trade talks for the World Trade Organisation, discussion includes the prospect of competition law enforcement moving up to a global level. While it is incapable of enforcement itself, the newly established International Competition Network (ICN) is a way for national authorities to coordinate their own enforcement activities.
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
International Enforcement
Chapter 5 of the post war Havana Charter contained an Antitrust code but this was never incorporated into the WTO's forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947. Office of Fair Trading Director and Professor Richard Whish wrote sceptically that it "seems unlikely at the current stage of its development that the WTO will metamorphose into a global competition authority.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
International Enforcement
Competition law has already been substantially internationalised along the lines of the US model by nation states themselves, however the involvement of international organisations has been growing. Increasingly active at all international conferences are the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organisation for Economic Co-Ooperation and Development (OECD), which is prone to making neo-liberal recommendations about the total application of competition law for public and private industries.
Monday, September 6, 2010
European Union Law
Finally, Articles 86 and 87 EC regulate the state's role in the market. Article 86(2) EC states clearly that nothing in the rules can be used to obstruct a member state's right to deliver public services, but that otherwise public enterprises must play by the same rules on collusion and abuse of dominance as everyone else. Article 87 similar to Article 81 EC, lays down a general rule that the state may not aid or subsidise private parties in distortion of free competition, but then grants exceptions for things like charites, natural disasters or regional development.
Sunday, September 5, 2010
European Union Law
Also under Article 82 EC, the European Council was empowered to enact a regulation to control mergers between firms, currently the latest known by the abbreviation of Regulation 139/2004/EC. The general test is whether a concentration (i.e. merger or acquisition) with a communtiy dimension (i.e. affects a number of EU member states) might significantly impede effective competition. Again, the similarity to the Clayton Act's substantial lessening of competition.
Saturday, September 4, 2010
European Union Law
Article 82 EC deals with monopolies, or more precisely firms who have a dominant market share and abuse that position. Unlike U.S. Antitrust, EC law has never been used to punish the existence of dominant firms, but merely imposes a special responsibility to conduct oneself appropriately. Specific categories of abuse listed in Article 82 EC include price discrimination and exclusive dealing, much the same as sections 2 and 3 of the U.S.. Clayton Act.
Friday, September 3, 2010
European Union Law
Article 81(1) EC then gives examples of "hard core" restrictive practices such as price fixing or maket sharing and 81 (2) EC confirms that any agreements are automatically void. However, just like the Statute of Monopolies 1623, Article 81 (3) EC creates exemptions, if the collusion is for distributional or technological innovation, gives consumers a "fair share" of the benefit and does not include unreasonable restraints ( or disproportionate, in ECJ terminology) that risk elimination competition anywhere.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
European Union Law
Article 81 EC's goals are unclear. There are two main schools of thought. The predominant view is that only consumer welfare considerations are relevant there. However, a recent book argues that this position is erroneous and that other Member State and European Union public policy goals (such as public health and the environment) should also be considered there. If this argument is correct then it could have a profound effect on the outcome of cases as well as the Modernisation process as a whole.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
European Union Law
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